Longscribe ← Back to homepage
FULL TRANSCRIPT

Golden Dome Missile Defense Hearing — Architecture, Cost & Deterrence

U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee · September 29, 2026

Source-backed editorial guide to the Senate Armed Services hearing on Golden Dome, including missile-defense architecture, space and sensor layers, interceptors, command and control, cost analysis, deterrence and the scale of the threat the system is intended to address.

Source
Watch the official Senate Armed Services hearing →
Event date

Featured speakers

  • Deb Fischer
  • Angus King
  • David J. Trachtenberg
  • Thomas O. Karako
  • David E. Mosher

Transcribed and published by Longscribe. Editorial policy.

Golden Dome is presented in the hearing as a system-of-systems rather than a single shield. The public discussion covers sensors, tracking, command and control, terrestrial and possible space-based interceptors, industrial capacity, allied participation and the strategic logic that determines what the architecture is meant to defend. Source · 00:00

The witnesses agree that the current homeland posture leaves major gaps against many cruise-missile and drone threats, but they differ in emphasis on cost, strategic stability and how ambitious the defense should be. Senator Angus King repeatedly tests whether the promised protection is commensurate with what could become one of the government's largest defense projects. Source · 03:51

Key facts

Hearing span
About 1 hour 16 minutes after removal of the Senate broadcast lead-in. Source · 00:00
Outside witnesses
David J. Trachtenberg, Thomas O. Karako and David E. Mosher. Source · 00:00
Current homeland-defense gap discussed
Witnesses distinguish limited existing defense against small rogue-state ICBM attacks from much weaker defenses against cruise missiles, drones and other lower-altitude threats. Source · 29:17
Why cost estimates vary
Architecture, defended area, raid size, interceptor quantities and whether space-based elements are included all materially change cost. Source · 02:15
Kill-chain risk
Karako argues that leadership, sensors, communications and command-and-control can be attacked even if interceptor inventories are strong. Source · 75:09

Threat framing, classified architecture and public accountability

The hearing opened with a bipartisan premise that the homeland faces a broader missile and drone threat than the limited defenses built mainly for small rogue-state ICBM attacks. Chair Deb Fischer emphasized cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and large drones. Senator Angus King agreed that some architectural details must remain classified but stressed that a program of this scale still requires public clarity about cost, scope and what level of protection taxpayers are buying.

Source · 00:00

Space interceptors, cost and the 'home game' argument

Thomas Karako argued that space-based interceptors should be evaluated against modern launch, sensor and networking technology rather than Cold War assumptions, while still acknowledging difficult physics, scaling and affordability. David Mosher and other witnesses discussed why cost estimates swing widely when analysts assume different constellation sizes, raid sizes and mission scope. The block also develops the idea that defending the homeland can exploit fixed infrastructure and existing sensor networks in ways expeditionary defenses cannot.

Source · 14:59

King presses effectiveness; witnesses place defense inside deterrence

King challenged witnesses to explain what fraction of plausible attacks a costly system could actually stop and whether limited defense risks provoking larger offensive arsenals. Trachtenberg argued that even imperfect defense can strengthen deterrence by complicating an adversary's plan and protecting critical retaliatory or command capabilities. The disagreement is less about whether defense has value than about how much value justifies a given architecture and budget.

Source · 29:17

Rounds and Kelly test the baseline: what is protected today?

Senator Mike Rounds asked witnesses to compare Golden Dome with current homeland protection. Karako distinguished the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense mission against a small number of rogue-state ICBMs from the much weaker U.S. posture against cruise missiles, drones and other threats seen regularly in Ukraine and the Middle East. Senator Mark Kelly then pressed the strategic consequence: if defenses improve, adversaries can respond with larger or different salvos.

Source · 36:12

Arms-race dynamics and strategic stability

Kelly and Trachtenberg explored the limiting case of a defense that could stop a large fraction of an adversary's force. Kelly raised the possibility that such a system could drive an opponent to build more offensive weapons; Trachtenberg emphasized deterrence benefits and the fact that Russia and China already field substantial air and missile defenses. The exchange highlights a core policy question: how to add protection without assuming adversaries will stand still.

Source · 45:21

Allies, sensors and integrated defense networks

The committee examined existing Russian and Chinese defenses, allied participation, sensor architectures and the need for integrated battle management. Witnesses emphasized that Golden Dome is not just an interceptor procurement program: it depends on early warning, tracking, communications and command systems that connect multiple services and domains. Members also raised whether the industrial base can scale those pieces fast enough.

Source · 49:39

Canada, economic relations and supply-chain chokepoints

Questions about cooperation with Canada broadened into whether defense planning can be separated from trade and alliance politics. Members and witnesses also focused on industrial chokepoints, especially interceptor production, sensors and the supplier base needed to sustain higher production rates. The discussion treats continental defense as both an alliance problem and a manufacturing problem.

Source · 58:45

What gets defended, and how the kill chain itself can be attacked

The closing phase returned to prioritization: cities, military assets, command nodes and the electric grid cannot all be defended equally against every raid. Mosher and King discussed the uncomfortable problem of defining the objective and communicating residual risk. Karako added that an adversary could attack leadership, sensors, communications and command-and-control rather than simply trying to overwhelm interceptors, making resilience of the entire kill chain central to the design.

Source · 70:38

Key timestamped claims

Each claim is an original Longscribe summary anchored to the moment(s) in the recording where it is supported; follow a timestamp to verify it in the source video.

00:00The hearing opened with a bipartisan premise that the homeland faces a broader missile and drone threat than the limited defenses built mainly for small rogue-state ICBM attacks. Chair Deb Fischer emphasized cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and large drones. Senator Angus King agreed that some architectural details must remain classified but stressed that a program of this scale still requires public clarity about cost, scope and what level of protection taxpayers are buying.

14:59Thomas Karako argued that space-based interceptors should be evaluated against modern launch, sensor and networking technology rather than Cold War assumptions, while still acknowledging difficult physics, scaling and affordability. David Mosher and other witnesses discussed why cost estimates swing widely when analysts assume different constellation sizes, raid sizes and mission scope. The block also develops the idea that defending the homeland can exploit fixed infrastructure and existing sensor networks in ways expeditionary defenses cannot.

29:17King challenged witnesses to explain what fraction of plausible attacks a costly system could actually stop and whether limited defense risks provoking larger offensive arsenals. Trachtenberg argued that even imperfect defense can strengthen deterrence by complicating an adversary's plan and protecting critical retaliatory or command capabilities. The disagreement is less about whether defense has value than about how much value justifies a given architecture and budget.

36:12Senator Mike Rounds asked witnesses to compare Golden Dome with current homeland protection. Karako distinguished the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense mission against a small number of rogue-state ICBMs from the much weaker U.S. posture against cruise missiles, drones and other threats seen regularly in Ukraine and the Middle East. Senator Mark Kelly then pressed the strategic consequence: if defenses improve, adversaries can respond with larger or different salvos.

45:21Kelly and Trachtenberg explored the limiting case of a defense that could stop a large fraction of an adversary's force. Kelly raised the possibility that such a system could drive an opponent to build more offensive weapons; Trachtenberg emphasized deterrence benefits and the fact that Russia and China already field substantial air and missile defenses. The exchange highlights a core policy question: how to add protection without assuming adversaries will stand still.

49:39The committee examined existing Russian and Chinese defenses, allied participation, sensor architectures and the need for integrated battle management. Witnesses emphasized that Golden Dome is not just an interceptor procurement program: it depends on early warning, tracking, communications and command systems that connect multiple services and domains. Members also raised whether the industrial base can scale those pieces fast enough.

58:45Questions about cooperation with Canada broadened into whether defense planning can be separated from trade and alliance politics. Members and witnesses also focused on industrial chokepoints, especially interceptor production, sensors and the supplier base needed to sustain higher production rates. The discussion treats continental defense as both an alliance problem and a manufacturing problem.

70:38The closing phase returned to prioritization: cities, military assets, command nodes and the electric grid cannot all be defended equally against every raid. Mosher and King discussed the uncomfortable problem of defining the objective and communicating residual risk. Karako added that an adversary could attack leadership, sensors, communications and command-and-control rather than simply trying to overwhelm interceptors, making resilience of the entire kill chain central to the design.

Key exchanges

  • King asked what level of protection a very expensive architecture can realistically deliver.

    Witnesses responded that effectiveness depends on the threat set and mission; Trachtenberg argued limited defense can still strengthen deterrence, while King continued to question cost-effectiveness and residual risk. — David J. Trachtenberg

    Why it matters: Captures the hearing's central cost-versus-mission dispute.

    Source · 29:17

  • Rounds asked what percentage of the country is protected today from the threats Golden Dome is intended to address.

    Karako distinguished nationwide coverage against a small rogue-state ICBM threat from the lack of comparable protection against cruise missiles and drones. — Thomas O. Karako

    Why it matters: Establishes the baseline against which Golden Dome is being compared.

    Source · 36:48

  • Members asked where production bottlenecks could prevent rapid deployment.

    Witnesses pointed to interceptor production and broader industrial-base constraints, alongside sensors and integrated command systems. — Panel

    Why it matters: Moves the debate from architecture diagrams to manufacturability.

    Source · 61:02

Timeline

  1. Opening — Fischer and King frame the threat, classification limits, cost and public accountability. Source · 00:00
  2. Witness statements — Trachtenberg, Karako and Mosher outline deterrence, architecture and cost perspectives. Source · 07:15
  3. Core Q&A — King, Rounds and Kelly test effectiveness, existing coverage and arms-race dynamics. Source · 29:17
  4. Allies and production — Members examine allied participation, Canada, sensors and industrial chokepoints. Source · 49:39
  5. Closing — The committee returns to prioritization, residual risk and kill-chain resilience before adjournment. Source · 71:05

Source & methodology

Built from the official Senate ISVP English caption feed. Rolling-caption duplication was removed before publication, broadcast lead-in time was normalized so 00:00 matches the substantive hearing start, and the resulting chronological evidence segments are retained in the repository. Public prose is original editorial paraphrase. Technical and strategic judgments are attributed to the witness or senator who made them.

Full transcript

Speaker names are editorially verified. Mixed-speaker ASR handoffs were split at reviewed turn boundaries.

00:00>> GOOD AFTERNOON. THE HEARING WILL COME TO ORDER. I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME OUR WITNESSES DISCUSSING OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA. OUR HOMELAND IS NOT A SANCTUARY. OUR ADVERSARIES ARE DEVELOPING AND FIELDING LONG-RANGE CAPABILITIES DESIGNED TO CHALLENGE AND DEBATE THE LIMITED DEFENSES CURRENTLY DEPLOYED.

00:00THESE INCLUDE CRUISE MISSILES, HYPERSONIC WEAPONS AND LARGE DRONES. THREATS THAT FALL BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF A FULL NUCLEAR ATTACK YET CAN STILL PROVIDE DEVASTATING DAMAGE TO OUR PORTS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. WE DO NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO THESE THREATS AND WE CANNOT AFFORD TO REMAIN COMPLACENT.

00:45OUR ADVERSARIES MUST NEVER BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN COERCE US WITH THREAT OF A LIMITED CONVENTIONAL MISSILE ATTACK ON OUR COUNTRY. WHICH IS WHY THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAS BEEN CLEARED -- CLEAR FOR YEARS ON BIPARTISAN BASES THE U.S.

00:45NEEDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE, INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS A SUPERCHARGED THESE EFFORTS. THE DEPARTMENT IS FINALLY PRIORITIZING HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HAS REQUESTED RESOURCES NEEDED TO RAPIDLY DEVELOP AND FIELD NOOSES TO AND HAS GRANTED THE GENERAL WITH ALL AUTHORITIES NECESSARY TO REALIZE THIS VISION AS DIRECT REPORTING PROGRAM MANAGER FOR GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA.

01:30I APPRECIATE HIS CLOSE COMMUNICATION WITH THIS COMMITTEE AND I'M CONFIDENT HE IS BUILDING IN ARCHITECTURE THAT COULD EQUIP THE U.S. WITH BETTER COVERAGE OVER AGAIN GREATER RELY -- VARIETY OF THREATS AND IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH INDUSTRY TO LOWER COST, EXPLORE INNOVATIVE IDEAS AND DELIVER CAPABILITIES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

01:30GOLDEN DOME COMPLETED ITS FIRST SUCCESSFUL TEST IN JUNE AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING ABOUT FUTURE TESTS WHEN OUR COMMITTEE WILL BE FORMALLY BRIEFED IN NOVEMBER. THE DETAILS OF THE ARCHITECTURE ARE HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND RIGHTLY SO.

02:15WE DO NOT WANT OUR ADVERSARIES TO KNOW THE EXACT CONTOURS OF GOLDEN DOME. UNFORTUNATELY KEEPING DETAILS FROM THE PUBLIC HAS LED TO IRRESPONSIBLE SPECULATION, OFTEN BASED ON FALSE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT GOLDEN DOME WILL LOOK LIKE AND WHAT IT WILL COST THE TAXPAYER.

02:15MR. MOSHER MOSHER, I UNDERSTAND THE CBO'S COST ESTIMATE THIS YEAR WAS UNDERPINNED BY ASSUMPTIONS CBO MADE BASED SOLELY ON THE LIMITED LANGUAGE IN PRESIDENT TRUMP'S EXECUTIVE ORDER AND IT DOES NOT REFLECT ANY OF GENERAL GUETLEIN GUETLEIN'S SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL PROGRAM ARCHITECTURE GUETLEIN'S SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL PROGRAM ARCHITECTURE, HIS ENGAGEMENTS WITH INDUSTRY TO LOWER COSTS PER SHOT, OR HOW HE PLANS TO SEQUENCE THE INTRODUCTION OF CAPABILITY OVER TIME AND LEVERAGE EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.

03:00I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED ENGAGEMENTS WITH CBO AND INFORMED ANALYSIS IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER THERE IS PLENTY WE CAN TALK ABOUT AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM THE EXPERT WITNESSES TODAY ABOUT THEIR VIEWS ON WITH THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD PRIORITIZE IN GOLDEN DOME.

03:00SENATOR KING, DO YOU HAVE ANY REMARKS YOU WOULD LIKE TO GIVE? SEN. KING: AND Q, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT HEARING, A DIFFICULT

Angus King, U.S. Senator03:51HEARING, A LOT OF DETAILS AND INFORMATION ARE CLASSIFIED AND MUST BE SO SO. I'M SURE OUR FRIENDS IN CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE WATCHING US AT THIS VERY MOMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS WILL BE ONE OF THE MOST EXPENSIVE AND LARGEST PROJECTS EVER UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S.

Angus King, U.S. Senator03:51GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW HOW MUCH OF THEIR MONEY WILL GO TO THIS PURPOSE AND WHAT WILL BE ACHIEVED, HOW THIS CAN AND SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE GIVEN THE EVOLUTION OF MISSILES MISSILES, CRUISE MISSILES, SPACE-BASED MISSILES AND ALTERNATIVES DEVELOPED TODAY.

Angus King, U.S. Senator03:51I LOOK FORWARD TO THE HEARING AND I HOPE WITNESSES, WE CAN TALK GENERALLY ABOUT THE CONCEPT, ITS FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL COST OF A PROTECTIVE SHIELD AGAINST MISSILE AND AIRBORNE ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES.

Angus King, U.S. Senator04:36I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU, BEARING IN MIND WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL IN TERMS OF SPECIFICS OF WHAT WE TALK ABOUT. FRANKLY I HAVEN'T FIGURED OUT EXACTLY WHERE THOSE LINES ARE, BUT WE WILL TRY TO BE MINDFUL OF NOT ALERTING OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES OF EXACTLY WHAT IT IS WE ARE WORKING ON ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator04:36WE WILL HEAR FROM OUR WITNESSES. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU,

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee05:25SENATOR KING. WELCOME TO OUR WITNESSES. MR. TRACHTENBERG SENATOR KING. WELCOME TO OUR WITNESSES. MR. TRACHTENBERG, YOU ARE A SENIOR SCHOLAR WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. APPRECIATE YOU BEING HERE TODAY AND YOU'RE RECOGNIZED FOR FIVE MINUTES FOR YOUR OPENING STATEMENT.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee05:27MR.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness05:39THANK YOU CHAIRPERSON FISCHER, RANKING MEMBER KING AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE. THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY. I WOULD ASK MY FULL STATEMENT ALONG WITH A PAPER I WROTE ON THE TOPIC BE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness05:43LET ME BEGIN BY EXPRESSING MY CONDOLENCES ON THE PASSING OF YOUR FORMER COLLEAGUE SENATOR JON KYL WHO WAS A TIRELESS CHAMPION OF DEFENDING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK. HIS LOSS WILL BE KEENLY FELT.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness05:43LET ME ALSO NOTE I HAVE NO SPECIAL INSIGHT INTO THE CURRENT ARCHITECTURAL DETAILS OF GOLDEN DOME. THE DEPARTMENT'S RETICENCE TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IS APPARENTLY DUE TO CONCERN ADDITIONAL DETAILS THEY PROVIDE ADVERSARIES WITH INFORMATION THEY WOULD PREFER THEY NOT HAVE, HIGHLIGHTING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE DESIRE FOR TRANSPARENCY AND THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness05:43NEVERTHELESS I APPRECIATE THIS COMMITTEE'S NEED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE BEING ASKED TO FUND. AND THE ADMINISTRATION MUST BE WILLING TO COMMUNICATE THE IMPORTANT RATIONALE FOR THIS PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. THAT SAID, I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON THREE ISSUES.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness06:29FIRST, STRATEGIC THREAT TO GOLDEN DOME THE HOMELAND DOES IT JUSTIFY THE GOLDEN DOME? EFFORT WHAT IMPEDIMENTS EXIST THAT STIFLES PROGRESS? THIRD, WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS DO TO OVERCOME THEM? FIRST I BELIEVE THE THREAT OF COERCIVE THREATS FROM ADVERSARIES WITH INCREASINGLY CAPABLE MISSILE SYSTEMS IS GROWING.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness06:29THAT MAY COMPLICATE GROWING -- WHERE THE RISK OF ENEMY RESPONSES MAY BE CONSIDERED TOO GREAT AND HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON U.S. ACTION, UNDERMINING DETERRENCE POLICY. AN EFFECTIVE GOLDEN DOME SYSTEM CAN MITIGATE CONCERNS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness07:15SECOND, I BELIEVE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO GOLDEN DOME DOME'S SUCCESS REFLECT MORE POLITICAL, BUREAUCRATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL BIASES RATHER THAN TECHNOLOGICAL OR PHYSICAL CHALLENGES. THESE INCLUDE OUTDATED COLD WAR -- POOR UNDERSTANDING OF DETERRENCE ISSUES, BELIEF ADVERSARY NUCLEAR THREATS AGAINST THE HOMELAND ARE IMPROBABLE, A CULTURE OF RISK AVOIDANCE, AND A DESIRE TO SPEND RESOURCES ON WHAT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE MORE URGENT PRIORITIES.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness07:15IDEOLOGICALLY-BASED POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS ROOTED IN THE COLD WAR NOTION SETTING A ROBUST MISSILE DEFENSE IS BOTH UNNECESSARY BECAUSE DETERRENCE IS RELIABLE AND DESTABILIZING BECAUSE IT WILL SPARK A DEFENSIVE ARMS RACE AS OTHERS SEEK TO OVERWHELM THE DEFENSE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness08:01BOTH NOTIONS ARE SERIOUSLY FLAWED. , MOREOVER THE ARGUMENT THAT GOLDEN DOME CANNOT BE 100% EFFECTIVE IS MISLEADING AS PERFECTION IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE. HEIGHTENING AN ADVERSARY'S UNCERTAINTY THAT ANY ATTACK WILL BE SUCCESSFUL STRENGTHENS DETERRENCE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness08:01PROVIDING SOME PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE IS IN MY VIEW THE ONLY MORALLY ACCEPTABLE COURSE OF ACTION FOR A GOVERNMENT WHOSE PRIMARY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY IS TO PROTECT THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF AMERICANS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness08:01IN LIGHT OF GROWING MISSILE THREATS IT IS TIME TO ABANDON THE OUTDATED THINKING THAT AMERICAN VULNERABILITY TO MISSILE ATTACK IS STABILIZING. WITH RESPECT TO COST, SPECULATIVE ESTIMATES ARE FRAUGHT WITH UNCERTAINTY AND BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS AND VARIABLES THAT MAY NOT BE VALID OR EVEN KNOWN.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness08:47THEREFORE ALLOWING SUCH ESTIMATES TO DRIVE POLICY DECISIONS IS SHORTSIGHTED AND UNWISE. THERE IS ALSO AN UNFORTUNATE TENDENCY TO CONFUSE COST WITH VALUE. I BELIEVE THE VALUE OF GOLDEN DOME BOTH AS A DETERRENT AND DEFENSE AGAINST POSSIBLE FAILURE OF DETERRENTS IS WORTH THE COST.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness08:47IT IS NOT THAT GOLDEN DOME IS UNAFFORDABLE BUT CRITICS BELIEVE FISCAL RESOURCES IT REQUIRES WOULD BE BETTER SPENT ON OTHER PRIORITIES. THERE IS CERTAINLY A LEGITIMATE DEBATE TO BE HAD OVERSPENDING PRIORITIES, BUT SUGGESTING EXTREME COST ELEMENTS MAKE GOLDEN DOME UNAFFORDABLE I BELIEVE IS DISINGENUOUS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness09:32FINALLY, HOW MIGHT CONGRESS HELP OVERCOME THESE IMPEDIMENTS? FIRST, REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR GOLDEN DOME AND THENDAA AND CODIFY AS POLICY THE U.S. SHALL BE DEFENDED AGAINST ALL TYPES OF MISSILE THREATS OF ANY RANGE LAUNCHED FROM ANY LOCATION.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness09:32SECOND, CONGRESS NEEDS TO WORK WITH THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE THE PROMISE OF GOLDEN DOME A REALITY INCLUDING REJECTING A BUSINESS AS USUAL APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO ACCELERATE ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL MINUTE -- MILITARY CAPABILITIES INCLUDING KINETIC AND NON-KINETIC SPACE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS TO STAY AHEAD OF THE THREAT CURVE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness10:17HISTORY DEMONSTRATES TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES CAN BE OVERCOME IF WE ARE COMMITTED TO OVERCOMING THEM AND NOT PREMATURELY DISMISSING THEM AS IMPOSSIBLE. FINALLY CONGRESS SHOULD COMMIT TO REGULAR LONG-TERM APPROPRIATIONS FUNDING STREAM NOT SUBJECT TO THE VAGARIES OF RECONCILIATION BILLS, CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS OR PARTISAN POLITICS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness10:17THE DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REQUIRES NOTHING LESS. WITH THESE INITIAL COMMENTS I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER MY VIEWS THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS. THANK YOU. CHAIR

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee10:53THANK YOU MR. TRACHTENBERG. NEXT WE HAVE DR. KARAKO KARAKO, DIRECTOR OF THE MISSILE-DEFENSE PROJECT AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. WELCOME. DR.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness11:05CHAIRMAN FISCHER CHAIRMAN FISCHER, RANKING MEMBER KING, AND A STINGLESS MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, THANK YOU. MISSILES HAVE BECOME WEAPONS OF CHOICE AND MISSILE DEFENSES HAVE INTERN BECOME FOUNDATIONAL TO DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. WE FIND OURSELVES AT A MOMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED GLOBAL DEMAND FOR CAPABILITIES THAT HAVE HELPED KEEP UKRAINE'S SOVEREIGNTY WOULD LITTLE SURPRISE UKRAINIANS UP A PATRIOT LAUNCHER ON THEIR CURRENCY.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness11:10I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT A HANDFUL OF TOPICS, COMMUNICATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, COST, SPACE INTERCEPTORS AND THE MISSILE ENTERPRISE. COMMUNICATION. DESPITE BEING A FLAGSHIP PRIORITY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE AS BOTH OF YOU NOTED, GOLDEN DOME SUFFERS FROM A SERIOUS LACK OF EXPLANATION OF WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS TRYING TO DO, GOLDEN DOME CONJURES UP FANCIFUL IDEAS AND MEANS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness11:55CRITICS AND CHEERLEADERS PROJECT ONTO IT THEIR FEARS OR FANTASIES AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION DOESN'T HELP. LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I THINK GOLDEN DOME IS. IT IS ABOUT CRATING A LIMITED BUT MEANINGFUL MEASURE OF AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE THAT ENHANCES STABILITY AND DETERRENCE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness11:55WHAT DO I MEAN BY THAT? THE COLD WAR IDEA OF STRATEGIC ATTACK WAS SYNONYMOUS WITH BIG NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THE HOMELAND. TODAY IT COMPREHENDS MUCH MORE. WITH CYBER ATTACKS, DRONES AND MISSILES THERE IS NOW THE SPECTER OF NON- NON-NUCLEAR STRATEGIC ATTACK.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness12:42IF GUAM WENT AWAY, WITHOUT THE RELEASE OF RADIATION IT WOULD STILL BE A STRATEGIC EVENT. WEAKNESS HERE IS PROVOCATIVE PROVOCATIVE. THE ABSENCE OF AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE INVITES CRISIS INSTABILITY, TEMPTING AN ADVERSARY TO TRY A DISARMING NON-NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness12:42IT IS NOT DETERRENCE, BUT INVITATION TO SEE WHAT THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH SHORT OF NUCLEAR REPRISAL. WITH APOLOGIES TO RONALD REAGAN, GOLDEN DOME WILL NOT MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMPOTENT AND OBSOLETE. BUT DETERRENCE BY DENIAL DOES RAISE THE THRESHOLD FOR ATTACK.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness12:42THAT WAS THE LOGIC WHEN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION BEGAN WORKING ON THE DEFENSE OF GUAM AND CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND. GOLDEN DOME EXTENDS THAT SAME LOGIC. RUSSIA AND CHINA KNOW THIS. THEY HAVE SOPHISTICATED HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THEIR HOMELANDS BUT WE REFER TO THEM WITH BORING NAMES LIKE ANTI-ACCESS ANTI-ACCESS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness13:27THIRD, COST. INSUFFICIENT COMMUNICATION FUELS MISPERCEPTION. SOME ESTIMATES ARE IN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE GREATER THAN GENERAL GUETLEIN GUETLEIN'S STATED BUDGET OF $185 BILLION FOR 10 YEARS. ONE LAYER OF GOLDEN DOME REFERS TO POCKETS OF LIMITED AREA DEFENSE, NORAD TERM OF ART.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness13:27THE TERM LIMITED IS RIGHT THERE ON THE TITLE. ANOTHER REASON COST ESTIMATES ARE OFF, INATTENTION TO THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE. EVEN WHAT PUBLIC INFORMATION TELLS US. THIS IS A HOME GAME AND HOME-FIELD ADVANTAGE TRANSLATES TO EASED MANNING AND -- PLUGGED INTO THE POWER GRID OF YOUR LOCAL MILITARY BASE HAS A LIGHTER FOOTPRINT THAN A MOBILE BATTERY BOUNCING AROUND THE DESERT.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness14:14A HOME GAME WOULD PERMIT THINGS LIKE A MESH NETWORK OF SENSORS. COMPARED TO WHAT UKRAINE DID WITH ACOUSTICS. WE COULD INTEGRATE DATA FEEDS THROUGH THINGS LIKE THE FAA'S AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RATERS. NEXT, SPACE INTERCEPTORS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness14:59SPACE AS A WAR FIGHTING DOMAIN ARE STILL SINKING IN. AS WITH OTHER WAR FIGHTING DOMAINS, IT WILL BE HOME TO VARIOUS WAR FIGHTING FUNCTIONS INCLUDING FIRES, SPACE TO SPACE, SPACE TO GROUND AND SPACE TO BOOSTING MISSILE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness14:59THE QUESTION IS WHETHER -- NOT WHETHER SBI SBI'S CAN WORK BUT WHETHER THE CONSTELLATION IS SCALABLE AND AFFORDABLE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CLEAR EYED, OPEN-MINDED AND IMAGINATIVE. CHEERLEADERS SHOULD STOP IGNORING PHYSICS AND THE ABSENTEE RATIO.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness14:59THIS IS A HARD PROBLEM. LIKEWISE CRITICS SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE IMPROVED FEASIBILITY AND LEAVE INTELLECTUAL BAGGAGE FROM THE COLD WAR BEHIND. IT IS NOT THE 1980'S. THIS CAN'T JUST BE A REPEAT. CONGRESS CAN PUSH THE PENTAGON AND INDUSTRY TO INNOVATE, SOLVE AND GET AFTER HARD PROBLEMS THAT WILL MEET THE CRITERIA OF SCALABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness15:44CONSISTENT WITH WAR FIGHTING FUNCTIONS TO BUILD CAPABILITY THAT ALLOWS US TO AMASS FROM SPACE AND PARTAKE OF WARFARE. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES ARE ABLE, MORE INNOVATIVE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS CAN BE DEVISED THIS IS AMERICA.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness15:44I WOULD URGE OBJECTIVITY AND PATIENCE. LET THESE EXPERIMENTS ADVANCE, SEE WHAT INDUSTRY CAN DELIVER IN A FEW YEARS. FINALLY WE SHOULD THINK OF HOW TO INSTITUTIONALIZE EFFORTS WITHIN THE BROADER MISSILE-DEFENSE ENTERPRISE. THE CONSTRUCT IS A TEMPORARY ONE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness16:29WE PROBABLY DON'T NEED MORE THAN ONE JOINT NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACQUISITION CENTRIC ORGANIZATION FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO MERGE GDA WITH M MDA INTO SOMETHING MORE FIT FOR PURPOSE. INGREDIENTS FOR SUCCESS MIGHT INCLUDE UNITY OF EFFORT, AUTHORITIES, HIGH-LEVEL ACCESS TO RESOURCES.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness16:29IT IS NO SECRET THE GOLDEN DOME NAME HAS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DEPOLARIZATION. THERE ARE PROBABLY WAYS TO GET AFTER THAT, TOO. CONGRESS COULD RENAME IT IN A FUTURE NDAA. IT IS THE THREAT THAT DRIVES THE NEED FOR GOLDEN DOME AND FOR DETERRENCE BY DENIAL.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness17:14MY WRITTEN STATEMENT INCLUDES WRECK OF A DACIANS FOR HOW TO SHAPE AND IMPROVE THESE EFFORTS. THE MOST IMMEDIATE IS TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FROM THE INITIAL ACCELERATION RAMP AND THE HOMELAND DEFENSE EFFORT. ALL THESE EFFORTS WILL STAND OR FALL ON 2027 FUNDING.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness17:14THANK YOU AND I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee17:42I WOULD REMIND EVERYONE THAT WHILE PRESIDENT TRUMP NAMED IT GOLDEN DOME DOME, THE FOCUS OF THIS LAYER DEFENSE SYSTEM CAME FROM THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND WAS PUT INTO A STUDY PUT INTO EFFECT IN THE FY24 NDAA.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee17:44SO IT CAME FROM US. MR. MOSHER MOSHER, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL -- DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS WITH THE CBO, CONGRESSIONAL, WELCOME. MR. MOSHER: THANK YOU VERY MUCH CHAIRPERSON FISCHER FISCHER, RANKING

David E. Mosher, Witness18:23MEMBER KING AND THE COMMITTEE. THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT HER ANALYSIS. I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT MY FORMAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD AND EMPHASIZE A FEW POINTS. CBO CBO, TO BE CLEAR, WAS ASKED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING TRUMP'S JANUARY 2010 FIVE EXECUTIVE ORDER, THE GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA.

David E. Mosher, Witness18:23CBO ESTIMATED THE COST OF A NOTIONAL CAPABILITY BASED ON GOALS AND -- IN THAT ORDER. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SINCE THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, HAVE CREATED AN INITIATIVE CALLED GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA. IT IS STILL BEING DEVELOPED IN DETAILS ABOUT WHAT THEY WILL DEVELOP AND WHEN THEY WILL DEPLOY IT IT, THE OBJECTIVE ARCHITECTURE, HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICLY LISTED.

David E. Mosher, Witness19:08SO WE DID NOT ESTIMATE THE COST OF THAT SYSTEM AT ALL. CBO ESTIMATES A SYSTEM CONSISTENT WITH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER WOULD COST $1.2 TRILLION TO BUILD AND OPERATE OVER 20 YEARS AND THESE ARE IN 2026 DOLLARS INCLUDING $740 BILLION FOR A SPACE LAYER, $270 BILLION FOR MULTIPLE LAYERS OF GROUND-BASED DEFENSES AND $188 BILLION FOR OTHER ACTIVITIES LIKE DEPLOYING A SENSOR SYSTEM AND CONDUCTING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

David E. Mosher, Witness19:08THE GOLDEN DOME AND CONDUCTING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THE GOLDEN DOME'S PRICE, THEY'VE ANNOUNCED A COST TARGET OF $185 BILLION, DIFFERENT FROM OUR NUMBER. LET ME TALK ABOUT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER. IT MARKS A REAL CHANGE IN U.S.

David E. Mosher, Witness19:54MISSILE POLICY AS MY CO-PANELISTS HAVE MENTIONED. IT IS MORE IN COMMON WITH REAGAN'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND RECENT POLICY LARGELY FOCUSED ON DEFENDING AGAINST SMALL NUMBERS OF MISSILES FROM SMALL COUNTRIES LIKE NORTH KOREA WITH LIMITED COUNTERMEASURES, THE SYSTEM WE HAVE IN ALASKA, REFLECTS THAT FOCUS BUT GOLDEN DOME IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER CALLS TO PROTECT THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES, ITS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND POPULATION FROM ALL AIR MISSILE ATTACKS FROM ANY COUNTRY INCLUDING RUSSIA AND CHINA.

David E. Mosher, Witness20:39THAT COULD AMOUNT TO HUNDREDS OF ICBM'S IF IT IS A LARGE ATTACK, THOUSANDS MORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS, HUNDREDS OF HYPERSONIC WEAPONS, IT COULD BE CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER AERIAL THREATS AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS, WHOLE RANGE OF THREATS WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT.

David E. Mosher, Witness20:39TO ARRIVE AT OUR ANALYST IT IS A MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM CONSISTENT WITH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER TO COUNTER MISSILE THREATS AND INCLUDES GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS AND A LAYER OF BOOST PHASE INTERCEPTORS BASED IN SPACE ALL OF WHICH WERE SPECIFIED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER ORDER TO COUNTER HYPERSONIC THREATS AND INCLUDE SPACE-BASED SENSORS AND SPECIALIZED INTERCEPTORS BASED ON THE GROUND.

David E. Mosher, Witness20:39TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES AND LONG-RANGE DRONES, AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS AND RADARS, AND TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST THE DRONE THREATS WE HAVE SEEN RECENTLY IN OTHER COUNTRIES. IT INCLUDES COUNTER DRONE DEFENSES. TO THE LARGEST EXTENT POSSIBLE CBO DEFENSES.

David E. Mosher, Witness21:25TO THE LARGEST EXTENT POSSIBLE CBO'S ARCHITECTURE RELIES ON EXISTING SYSTEMS. YOU CAN DEPLOY THINGS QUICKLY IF THEY ARE EXISTING. NEW TECHNOLOGIES TAKE LONGER TO DEVELOP. SOME LIKE SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTORS WE DON'T HAVE ANY. I WANTED TO EMPHASIZE CBO CBO'S ESTIMATE IS SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY AND BASED ON THIS NOTIONAL SYSTEM.

David E. Mosher, Witness21:25COST COULD BE HIGHER OR LOWER DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF THINGS TO THE BIGGEST DETERMINANT IS THE SIZE OF THE THREAT AND TYPE OF THREAT DEFENSE IS DESIGNED TO HANDLE. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER IN OUR VIEW SETS A HIGH BAR ON THAT AND THAT IS REFLECTED IN OUR ESTIMATE.

David E. Mosher, Witness22:11TO ADDRESS UNCERTAINTY AND ALLOW RATERS -- READERS TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MIND WE HAVE A BUILDING BLOCK APPROACH AND REPORTED THE COST OF EACH ELEMENT AT EACH LAYER SO WE COULD SEE WHAT WE HAD DONE.

David E. Mosher, Witness22:11AND YOU COULD COME UP WITH YOUR OWN ARCHITECTURE USING THOSE PIECES. IN GENERAL COST COULD BE LOWER IF DOD BUILDS A SYSTEM THAT IS SMALLER. SOME THINGS MY CO-PANELISTS MENTIONED, IT COULD COST LESS THAN OUR ESTIMATE.

David E. Mosher, Witness22:11IF YOU HAD SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTORS TO DEAL WITH A SMALLER ATTACK, THAT WOULD REDUCE COSTS. IF YOU FOCUSED AS DR. KARAKO MENTIONED ON JUST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WITH GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS THAT WOULD REDUCE COSTS.

David E. Mosher, Witness22:56ON THE OTHER HAND COST COULD BE HIGHER IF THEY BUILD A LARGER SYSTEM INTENDED TO DEAL WITH A FULL SOVIET -- EXCUSE ME, RUSSIAN, OR CHINESE ATTACK. COULD BE HIGH REVENUE SYSTEMS ENCOUNTER COST GROWTH.

David E. Mosher, Witness22:56AND IN AN IMPORTANT WAY COULD BE HIGHER IF OUR ADVERSARIES TAKE STEPS TO UNDERMINE THOSE DEFENSES, INCREASE THE SIZE OF THEIR FORCES, ENGAGE IN COUNTER MEASURES INVOLVED IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DEFENSES.

David E. Mosher, Witness22:56THOSE COULD LEAD TO HIGHER COSTS. THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT CBO CBO'S WORK AND I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU MR.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee23:47MOSHER. DR. KARAKO THANK YOU MR. MOSHER. DR. KARAKO, NEAR-TERM WHAT ARE NEST OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE COVERAGE OF THE HOMELAND AGAINST MISSILE ATTACKS? WHAT IS YOUR OPINION? DR. KARAKO: THERE IS A LOT THERE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness24:02A LOT OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISSILES. I WILL HARKEN BACK TO THE TITLE OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ORDER, IT WAS CALLED IRON DOME FOR AMERICA. THEY DECIDED THERE COULD BE COPYRIGHT ISSUES SO IT IS CALLED GOLDEN DOME.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness24:02IRON DOME IS THE LOWEST TIER OF ISRAEL'S MULTITIER MISSILE DEFENSE. WHERE I START FROM IS AT THE BOTTOM. WE HAVE A LIMITED GMD ICBM DEFENSE FROM ROGUE ROGUEEXTRAORDINARY ROGUEEXTRAORDINARYR DRONE, COUNTER CRUISE MISSILE TYPE OF THING.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness24:02CHAIR FISCHER: DO YOU THINK AT

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee24:39THAT LEVEL WE CURRENTLY HAVE A NUMBER OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WE COULD LEVERAGE? DR. KARAKO: YES, THOUGH SYSTEMS ARE USED LARGELY FOR REGIONAL

Thomas O. Karako, Witness24:52DEFENSE OR BASE DEFENSE. WE PUT OUT A REPORT CALLED NORTH AMERICA AS A REGION 2 TO EMPHASIZE THOSE AIR AND MISSILE THREATS ARE COMING TO A THEATER NEAR YOU. THAT IS WHAT THIS GOLDEN DOME DOME, I WOULD ALSO SAY THE JOINT INTEGRATED TASK FORCE 401 IS GETTING AFTER, THE DRONE THREATS AND CRUISE MISSILE THREATS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness24:52THE FIRST AND MOST NEEDFUL THING ARE THE SENSING CAPABILITIES TO HAVE BETTER AIR SURVEILLANCE AND TRACKING AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION OF THE LOW AND SLOW DRONES, OF THE CRUISE MISSILE MISSILES. YOU CAN'T KILL IT IF YOU CAN'T SEE IT.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness24:52FIRST AND FOREMOST I WOULD GO AFTER THE SENSORS AND START WITH AERIAL THREATS AND BUILD UP. CHAIR FISCHER: WHAT DO YOU SEE

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee25:40AS CHALLENGES IN TRYING TO A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM THAT WOULD INTEGRATE SYSTEMS ACROSS DIFFERENT DOMAINS, MULTIPLE SERVICES, A NUMBER OF AGENCIES? AND THE MAIN POINT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO HIT IS, IS OUR INDUSTRIAL BASE UP TO THE TASK?

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee25:44DR. KARAKO: I MENTIONED THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, AT THE

Thomas O. Karako, Witness26:11TIME IT WAS DESCRIBED AS THE PERFECT AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PROBLEM. WHY? BECAUSE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD IT IS INCOME OF THE NUMBER OF THREATS THAT FACE US, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION CHALLENGE OF PUTTING TOGETHER THE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness26:11SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO OPERATE ALONE ON A FREIGHT SO THE DEFENSE OF GUAM EFFORT AND GOLDEN DOME EFFORT MUST GET THESE SYSTEMS WE HAVE TODAY TO WORK TODAY IN CONCERT WITH ANOTHER AND WHAT THAT MEANS IS TO NOT ALL SHOOT AT THE SAME THING.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness26:11YOU COULD HAVE MULTIPLE SYSTEMS AND WE HAVE SEEN THIS IN THE REAL WORLD, WE NEED FIRE DECONFLICTION AND FIRE CONTROL TO USE THESE EFFICIENTLY AND NOT SHOOT MORE INTERCEPTORS THAN YOU NEED. THAT IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE BATTLE MANAGEMENT PROBLEM.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness26:57CHAIR FISCHER: MR. TRACHTENBERG TRACHTENBERG,

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee27:08WHAT CAPABILITIES DO RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE THAT THEY ARE DEVELOPING THAT YOU BELIEVE THREATS IN OUR HOMELAND THE MOST AND WHY ARE THESE THREATS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE HAVE FACED IN THE PAST?

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee27:09MR. TRACHTENBERG: I THINK BOTH RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE BEEN

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness27:25ENGAGED NOW FOR MANY YEARS, THEY ARE VERY AGGRESSIVE, NUCLEAR NUCLEAR, STRATEGIC AND NONSTRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM TO DEVELOP NEWER, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS. FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION EVERY THING FROM THE CZAR MAT TO THE -- USE AGAINST UKRAINE UKRAINE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness27:25A NUCLEAR CAPABLE SYSTEM, TO NUCLEAR TORPEDOES AND THINGS LIKE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN AGGRESSIVELY MODERNIZING THEIR CAPABILITIES. I THINK IT WAS PUTIN HIMSELF WHO NOT LONG AGO SAID THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WAS WELL OVER 95% COMPLETE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness27:25THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID FOR THE U.S. THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO BEEN MODERNIZING THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEM AND BUILDING UP CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AS WELL. THE DISCOVERY OF SOME 350 PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN CHINESE ICBM SILO SUGGESTS THE CHINESE ABANDONED THE POLICY OF MINIMUM DETERRENCE, IF THEY EVER ACTUALLY BELIEVED THAT.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness28:11THEY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING FOR ACTIONABLE -- FRACTIONABLE BOMBARDMENT SYSTEMS, HYPERSONIC CAPABILITIES. THE THREATS THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN GROWING SUBSTANTIALLY IN MY CONCERN IS, THE GROWTH IN THE MISSILE THREAT IS OUTPACING OUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH IT.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness28:57WE STILL HAVE A VERY LIMITED NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY DIRECTED AGAINST ROGUE STATES LIKE NORTH KOREA WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF TERRESTRIAL BASED INTERCEPTORS. I THINK WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DO MORE. CHAIR

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee29:17THANK YOU. SENATOR KING? SEN. KING: FIRST I HAVE AN ISSUE WITH HOW THIS PROGRAM IS BEING

Angus King, U.S. Senator29:26FUNDED. THAT IS NOT REALLY YOUR PROBLEM, BUT IT IS BEING FUNDED PRINCIPALLY THROUGH RECONCILIATION, WHICH IS A TOTALLY PARTISAN PROCESS WITH VERY LITTLE INPUT FROM THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE OR MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE. IT HAS VERY LITTLE RESTRICTIONS IN THE WAY OF HOW IT CAN BE SPENT.

Angus King, U.S. Senator29:26I WANT ON THE RECORD THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST EXPENSIVE AND IMPORTANT INITIATIVES OF THIS GOVERNMENT AND IT SHOULD BE ONE THAT HAS BROUGHT POPULAR SUPPORT, INDICATED BY BROAD SUPPORT HERE IN THE CONGRESS.

Angus King, U.S. Senator29:26THE FACT THAT THE VAST BULK OF IT WAS FUNDED FIRST IN RECONCILIATION LAST YEAR AND IS PROPOSED FOR THIS YEAR, I THINK IS VERY BOTHERSOME FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PROCESS. I HAVE A HARD TIME FIGURING OUT HOW THIS WOULD WORK IN PRACTICE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator30:11HERE IS A SIMPLE EXAMPLE. GUAM AS WE KNOW IS A PLACE IN THE PACIFIC, A TERRITORY IN THE PACIFIC, THAT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO US STRATEGICALLY SO WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL MISSILE DEFENSE CAPACITY THERE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator30:11SITTING WHERE YOU ARE MR. MOSHER WAS THE GENERAL IN CHARGE OF THAT AND I ASKED HIM HOW MUCH IT COST TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR GUAM. THE ANSWER WAS $8 BILLION.

Angus King, U.S. Senator30:11I WAS NOT DOING EMAIL ON MY PHONE, I WAS ASKING CLAUDE HOW MANY CITIES IN THE U.S. HAVE 50,000 PEOPLE OR MORE. THE ANSWER WAS 780. IF WE ARE GOING TO PROTECT THOSE 780 CITIES THE WAY WE PROTECT GUAM THE CALCULATION IS $6.2 TRILLION.

Angus King, U.S. Senator30:56THIS $185 BILLION TO ME IS NOT A REALISTIC NUMBER. THE OTHER PIECE OF THIS THAT BOTHERS ME, I WAS LOOKING AT THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER. SAYS WILL DETER AND DEFEND ITS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE OF ITS CITIZENS.

Angus King, U.S. Senator30:56THE IMPLICATION OF THE TERM GOLDEN DOME IS A NATIONAL COVERAGE. I THINK ALL OF YOU WILL AGREE THAT THAT IS JUST NOT IN THE CARDS. SO ONE QUESTION THAT HAS TO BE DISCUSSED IS, WHO IS BEING PROTECTED?

Angus King, U.S. Senator31:41AND WHAT IS THE GOLDEN DOME ACTUALLY GOING TO DO? THE NOMENCLATURE IMPLIES AN ARCH OVER THE ENTIRE COUNTRY THAT IS PROTECTED FROM ANY KIND OF MISSILE ATTACK. WOULD YOU AGREE THAT IS NOT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE?

Angus King, U.S. Senator31:41MR. TRACHTENBERG: I WOULD SUGGEST THE NATURE OF GOLDEN

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness32:12DOME IS TO PRODUCE A SYSTEM CAPABLE OF A MUCH BROADER LEVEL OF DEFENSE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. SEN.

Angus King, U.S. Senator32:21THIS MEANS EVERY AMERICAN CITIZEN CAN SLEEP BETTER TONIGHT BECAUSE THEY ARE PROTECTED FROM A MISSILE ATTACK? MR. TRACHTENBERG: WITH ALL DUE RESPECT I DON'T THINK THAT IS

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness32:30THE APPROPRIATE METRIC TO USE. I BELIEVE THE APPROPRIATE METRIC IS, CAN WE PROVIDE -- CAN WE BUILD A SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES A LEVEL OF PROTECTION THAT DISSUADE'S AND DISCOURAGES -- SEN. KING: WHO IS BEING

Angus King, U.S. Senator32:45PROTECTED AND WHO MAKES THAT -- SEN. KING: WHO IS BEING PROTECTED AND WHO MAKES THAT DECISION? ARE YOU TELLING ME EVERY CITIZEN IN AMERICA CAN BE? PROTECTED BY THIS SYSTEM? MR. TRACHTENBERG: NO, I'M NOT SAYING EVERY CITIZEN CAN BE

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness32:54PROTECTED. SEN.

Angus King, U.S. Senator32:56IF THAT IS THE CASE, WHO DECIDES WHO IS PROTECTED AND WHO IS NOT? MR. TRACHTENBERG: I THINK THE ACTUAL ARCHITECTURE WOULD BE,

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness33:04AGAIN, I DON'T HAVE INSIGHT INTO THE CURRENT ARCHITECTURAL PLANS BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE DEPLOYED PROBABLY IN PHASES OR STAGES, AT CERTAIN TIMES WHEN ARCHITECTURE IS READY. BUT I THINK IT SHOULD BE EXPANSIVE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness33:04I'M A FIRM BELIEVER IN THE OLD AIR FORCE RECRUITING MOTTO, AIM HIGH. I THINK WE SHOULD AIM HIGH ON THIS. WE MAY NOT GET THERE, I AGREE. BUT I WOULD RATHER AIM HIGH THEN AIM LOW.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness33:04SEN.

Angus King, U.S. Senator33:35THESE ARE GOOD-FAITH QUESTIONS. I'M JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THIS THING. IF IT IS NOT GOING TO PROTECT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY, WHO WILL IT PROTECT, HOW IS THAT DECIDED AND WHAT IS THE REALISTIC COST ESTIMATE?

Angus King, U.S. Senator33:37IS MY GUAM EXAMPLE COMPLETELY CRAZY? THERE IS A CASE WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A GOLDEN DOME OVER GUAM AND IT COST $8 BILLION TO COVER 200 SQUARE MILES. LOS ANGELES IS 400 SQUARE MILES.

Angus King, U.S. Senator33:37PROTECTING LOS ANGELES WOULD COST TWICE AS MUCH AS PROTECTING GUAM. WHAT AM I MISSING? >> I COULD TAKE A STAB AT THAT. I WOULD SUGGEST THE GUAM ANALOGY IS PERHAPS NOT THE MOST APT ONE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator33:37GUAM HAS AS YOU NOTED AN OUTSIZED SIGNIFICANCE FOR OUR OVERALL OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR THE PACIFIC AND IN THAT SENSE THE DEFENSE OF GUAM IS ABOUT BUYING TIME FOR THE FORCES STATIONED THERE OR BASED OUT OF THERE TO END THE THREAT BY OTHER MEANS.

Angus King, U.S. Senator34:24SEN. PROTECTING GUAM? DR. KARAKO: NOT JUST THE TERRITORY BUT THE POWER

Thomas O. Karako, Witness34:43PROJECTION. LOS ANGELES HAS SOME PORTS, BUT NOT THE POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY. TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION OF WHAT SHOULD BE PROTECTED. ISA JUST WALKING DOWN THE HALL OF THE PENTAGON TO THE NORTH COMM OFFICE AND ASKING THEM FOR THEIR DEFENDED ASSET LIST, WANT TO END LIST, AND START THERE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness34:43SEN. KING: ONE THING IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH I THINK

Angus King, U.S. Senator35:06MAKES SENSE, THE U.S. WILL SECURE SECOND STRIKE ABILITY. THAT WOULD IMPLY SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR THE SENTINEL PROJECT OR THE STEALTHY NOTES OF OUR SUBMARINES OR BASES OF OUR AIR FORCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT I'M TRYING TO GET IT WHAT THIS THING WILL REALLY DO AND AT WHAT COST.

Angus King, U.S. Senator35:06THE MOST SERIOUS NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT FACING THIS COUNTRY TODAY IS THE $40 TRILLION DEBT. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TESTIFIED TO THAT YEARS AGO AND I CAN'T DISAGREE. WE CAN JUST SAY THIS IS IMPORTANT AND WE WILL SPEND WHATEVER IT TAKES.

Angus King, U.S. Senator35:06WE NEED TO HAVE REALISTIC COST ESTIMATES. $185 BILLION TO PROTECT, WHAT PART OF THE COUNTRY, 10%, 20%? I THINK WE HAVE TO HAVE ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS. THANK YOU, MADAM CHAIR. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU, SENATOR KING.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee36:06SENATOR ROUNDS, YOU ARE RECOGNIZED. SEN. ROUNDS: LET ME LOOK AT THIS

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator36:11A LITTLE DIFFERENT. I RESPECT WHAT SENATOR KING IS SUGGESTING BUT LET'S START WITH WHERE WE'RE AT TODAY AND WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WOULD BE. IF, AS THE SENATOR SUGGESTED, THIS MAY PROTECT 10% AND WE SPENDING THAT KIND OF MONEY, THE ANSWER IS IS TODAY DO WE HAVE ANY PROTECTION AT ALL?

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator36:12I WILL BEGIN WITH DR. KARAKO KARAKO. BEGIN WITH THIS. WHAT PERCENT OF THE U.S. IS PROTECTED TODAY FROM THESE INCOMING MISSILES? DR. KARAKO: [INDISCERNIBLE] PARDON ME.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness36:48YOU'RE TALKING A ROGUE ICBM [INDISCERNIBLE] PARDON ME. YOU'RE TALKING A ROGUE ICBM, THE SYSTEM COVERS -- PROVIDES CONTINENTAL, NATIONAL COVERAGE AGAINST A SMALL NUMBER OF THREATS. BUT AGAIN THE KIND OF THREATS WE SEE ON A WEEKLY BASIS IN UKRAINE OR THE MIDDLE EAST, GARDEN-VARIETY CRUZ MISSILES AND DRONES --CRUISE MISSILES AND DRONES, WE ARE ASTONISHINGLY NOT PROTECTED.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness36:48YOU SEE DRONES AROUND BARKSDALE. SEN.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator37:15IF YOU ARE TO ASK THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THEY WOULD SAY WE HAVE NORAD AND THE PROTECTION IS THERE. THE REALITY IS FOR A LONG SHOT FROM NORTH KOREA WE CAN HANDLE THAT BUT RIGHT NOW WE ARE TALKING ABOUT TAKING THE NEXT STEP TO AVOID A NUCLEAR CONFLICT AND PART OF THAT MEANS BEING ABLE TO ASSURE OUR COMPETITORS, ADVERSARIES THAT EVEN IF THEY WERE TO GET OFF A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STRIKE, THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEFENSE -- DEFEND AGAINST IT AND RESPOND WITH A DEVASTATING RESPONSE, A RESPONSE TO STRIKE THEY WOULD NEVER WANT TO SEE.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator37:16THIS IS ONE MORE STEP IN SAYING, LET'S NOT GO TO NUCLEAR WAR. THE QUESTION IS, HOW DO WE DO THAT WITHOUT DESTROYING OUR ECONOMY? THE IDEA BEHIND THIS TO BEGIN WITH WAS, THE LAYERED EFFECT WE HAVE IS A FIRST STEP, BUT LET'S THINK OF HOW THIS WILL BE PUT TOGETHER, SO WE HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator38:02I ALSO AGREE WITH SENATOR KING WHEN HE SAYS, SHOULD IT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO GO TO RECONCILIATION TO GET THIS STARTED? I WOULD SAY NO, THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS. I WON'T LAY FAULT, BUT I'M SAYING WE NEED TO GET BACK TO A BIPARTISAN APPROACH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator38:02BUT WE COULDN'T WAIT ANOTHER YEAR TO HAVE THAT HAPPEN, OR WE WOULD BE FARTHER BEHIND THAN WE ARE RIGHT NOW. LET'S GET BACK TO A BIPARTISAN AND INCLUDED IN THE UNDERLYING APPROPRIATIONS WHICH IS ONGOING.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator38:48IF WE TALK ABOUT THE PLAN ITSELF, TODAY, THERE ARE A COUPLE THINGS WE NEED. WE HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SENSE IT, IDENTIFY IF THERE IS AN ADVERSARY COMING OUT. WE CAN DO SOME OF THAT BY CYBER, WE CHECK ON THEM, WE KNOW WHAT THEY ARE UP TO, CAN SEE WHAT THEY ARE PLANNING.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator38:48WE KNOW BEFORE A LAUNCH WE CAN HAVE A SENSE OF WHAT IS GOING ON. BUT UPON A LAUNCH WE NEED WORLDWIDE COVERAGE, THE ABILITY TO SEE THESE LAUNCHES. CAN YOU TALK FOR A SECOND ABOUT WHAT THAT WOULD ENTAIL IN TERMS OF OUR ABILITY TO SEE WORLDWIDE ON THESE TYPES OF LAUNCHES THAT WOULD CREATE THE CONFIRMATION THAT SOMETHING IS GOING ON?

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator39:33I WILL START WITH DR. KARAKO KARAKO. DR. KARAKO: IN TERMS OF LAUNCH

Thomas O. Karako, Witness39:41DETECTION, ICBM IN TERMS OF LAUNCH DETECTION, ICBM, WE HAVE OVERHEAD INFRARED TO DETECT LAUNCH. BUT THERE ARE IMPORTANT INITIATIVES, GOING BACK TO THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION AND BEFORE, IN TERMS OF HYPERSONIC AND BALLISTIC TRACKING FOR MORE MANEUVERABLE THINGS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness39:44SEN. ROUNDS: WE ALSO HAVE TO

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator40:00ATTRACT A MOVING OBJECT AND SEPARATED OUT FROM OTHER OBJECTS WHICH MEANS RADAR FOR THE MOST PART. 3 THE.1 OF THE MAGNETIC SPECTRUM IS CRITICAL FOR OUR BEST RATERS. RIGHT NOW IT IS CONSTANTLY UNDER ATTACK BY COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS THAT WANT TO TAKE IT OVER.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator40:01CAN YOU TALK ABOUT HOW SERIOUS THAT IS IN TERMS OF A SIMPLE ISSUE WE HAVE TO PROTECT RIGHT NOW? DR. KARAKO: THE LOWER THREE YOU IDENTIFIED, THAT IS WHERE SO

Thomas O. Karako, Witness40:27MANY OF OUR RADARS OPERATE. SPY RADARS, GATOR, A LOT OF THE RADARS WE HAVE TODAY ARE IN THAT BAND. IF YOU HAVE COMMERCIAL NOISE IT WILL JAM THEM. SEN. ROUNDS: THAT IS JUST THE

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator40:42SENSING OF IT. THEN WE HAVE TO IDENTIFY AND THIS IS WHERE THE SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS COMING, WE HAVE TO IDENTIFY EARLY BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT THAT COMING INTO THE U.S. WE WANT THE ABILITY TO HAVE SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO TAKE OUT THESE TARGETS.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator40:44SOME OF THOSE OBESE SPACE-BASED, AREN'T THEY? DR. KARAKO: YES, THIRD, CAN BE X BAND RELATED AND KINETIC AS

Thomas O. Karako, Witness41:04WELL. SEN.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator41:07I'M RUNNING OUT OF TIME BUT I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT WE HAVE THIS DISCUSSION. COMPARED TO WHAT WE HAVE RIGHT NOW, WHAT THE GOLDEN DOME WILL PROVIDE HIS MAGNITUDES MORE OF AN OPPORTUNITY.

Mike Rounds, U.S. Senator41:09QUESTION IS HOW DO WE LIVER THIS, PERIOD -- HOW DO WE DELIVER THIS? CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU, SENATOR ROUNDS.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee41:29RANKING MEMBER READ -- REID REID, YOUR RECOGNIZE. SENATOR KELLY? SEN. KELLY: MR. TRACHTENBERG YOUR RECOGNIZE. SENATOR KELLY? SEN. KELLY: MR. TRACHTENBERG, I HAVE GOT MAJOR ISSUES ON THE

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator41:45PHYSICS OF THESE ISSUES ESPECIALLY THE SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR PHYSICS OF THESE ISSUES ESPECIALLY THE SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR. PHYSICS FAVORS THE OFFENSE IN A BIG WAY. INTERCEPTORS CAN BE DEFEATED BY COUNTERMEASURES. OFTEN WHEN WE TESTED THESE THINGS WE DON'T ACCOUNT FOR THOSE.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator41:45THE OTHER ISSUE HERE IS, DETERRENCE IS ABOUT PERCEPTION. THIS ADMINISTRATION MIGHT SEE GOLDEN DOME AS A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, BUT WOULD ALSO MATTERS HERE FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY IS, HOW DOES RUSSIA AND CHINA SEE THIS?

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator41:45FOR DECADES U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY RECOGNIZE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES. THEY ARE CONNECTED. THE BASIC CONCERN IS STRAIGHTFORWARD. IF ONE SIDE BUILDS DEFENSES THAT COULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OTHER SIDE'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT, THE OTHER SIDE HAS AN INCENTIVE TO BUILD MORE OR BETTER OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, WITH MORE COUNTERMEASURES.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator42:30THAT DYNAMIC WAS PART OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND NEGOTIATING LIMITS ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS DURING THE COLD WAR. WE CONSIDERED THIS VERY SERIOUSLY. SO, WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE RESPONSE AND EXPANSION OF U.S.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator42:30STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAN GENERATE. IF RUSSIA AND CHINA BELIEVE GOLDEN DOME COULD REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR RETALIATORY FORCES, THEY COULD RESPOND BY EXPANDING THEIR ARSENALS, DEVELOPING NEW WAYS TO PENETRATE OUR DEFENSES, OR, SEEING THE U.S.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator43:16AS WILLING TO TAKE A LOT MORE RISK IF WE ARE IN A CRISIS. SO MR. TRACHTENBERG TRACHTENBERG, WHAT DO USS RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE THINKING ABOUT GOLDEN DOME TODAY? MR. TRACHTENBERG: I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness43:50I THINK RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE MOVING OUT IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT THE U.S. PLANS TO DO OR MAY DO IN THE FUTURE. AS I SAID, BOTH RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE BEEN MODERNIZING THEIR OWN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness43:50I BELIEVE THEY ARE DOING NOT BECAUSE THEIR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES DON'T ALIGN WITH OURS. I DO THINK RUSSIA AND CHINA WILL OPPOSE GOLDEN DOME JUST AS THEY HAVE OPPOSED ALL U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE EFFORTS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness43:50SEN. KELLY: IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator44:20THINK THEY ARE ON A PATH REGARDLESS OF ANY STEPS WE TAKE. AS I THINK SENATOR KING POINTED OUT, THE CHINESE ARE WATCHING THIS TODAY. MR. TRACHTENBERG: WHAT I'M

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness44:35SAYING IS, THERE IS NO MECHANISTIC ACTION-REACTION FORMULA. HISTORICALLY THE BELIEF THAT THE U.S. GENERATES REACTIONS ON THE PART OF ADVERSARIES HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN TO BE SO. I GO BACK, YOU MENTIONED THE COLD WAR.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness44:37SEN. KELLY: ISN'T IT LOGICAL

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator44:53THAT IF WE WERE TO BUILD -- LET'S JUST SAY, WHEN YOU STUDY MATH, YOU LOOK AT THINGS AT THE LIMIT. IF WE WERE TO BUILD A SYSTEM THAT THEY PERCEIVE IS ABLE TO TAKE OUT SAY A LARGE SALVO OF ICBM'S.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator44:55WHAT WOULD THE LOGICAL THING THING, WHAT WOULD BE A LOGICAL RESPONSE? MR. TRACHTENBERG: NOT TO CONSIDER ATTACK IN THE FIRST

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness45:21PLACE. SEN.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator45:22YOU DON'T THINK THE LOGICAL THING WOULD BE A LARGER SALVO OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? THIS WILL BE SIZED FOR SOMETHING. MR.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness45:30BUT IF YOU LOOK AT HISTORY -- SEN. KELLY: SO YOU THINK THAT IS

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator45:33LOGICAL? MR. TRACHTENBERG: IF YOU LOOK AT THE HISTORICAL RECORD, YOU SEE

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness45:40THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE MOVING OUT BASED ON THEIR OWN CONSIDERATIONS, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT THE U.S. HAS OR HAS NOT DONE. SEN.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator45:49ON ALL KINDS OF THINGS AND WE DO EXACTLY THE SAME THING. MR. TRACHTENBERG: YOU MAY WERE

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness45:53MEMBER THE TREATY OF 1972 INTENDED TO VENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM BUILDING UP ITS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES BECAUSE WE ISSUED ESCH ESCHEWED DEFENSE SO THEY HAD NO DEFENSE TO COUNTER. IN REALITY WE HAD THE GREATEST INCREASE IN SOVIET ICBM ICBM'S AND WARHEADS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE ABM TREATY.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness45:55SO THEIR REACTION SUGGESTS -- SEN.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator46:19THE GREATEST INCREASE AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY. AND HOW MANY ICBM ICBM'S DO THE RUSSIANS HAVE TODAY AS A PERCENTAGE COMPARED TO WHAT THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY? MR. TRACHTENBERG: THE RUSSIANS PUT MOST OF THEIR NUCLEAR

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness46:37CAPABILITY ON THE LARGE LAND-BASED MISSILES. SEN.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator46:40ISN'T IT TRUE THAT BECAUSE OF TREATIES WE HAVE SIGNED, WE HAVE REDUCED THE SIZE OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL, AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE REDUCED CONSIDERABLY THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEY HAVE TODAY? MR. TRACHTENBERG: IT IS TRUE WE HAVE REDUCED AS A RESULT OF

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness46:58ARMS-CONTROL TREATIES THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR ARSENAL. IT IS ALSO TRUE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS SUSPENDED INSPECTIONS UNDER THE NEW TREATY YEARS AGO AND REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO CONTINUE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness46:58WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO BUILD MISSILES OR OTHER CAPABILITIES. WHAT WE DO KNOW IS, THEY HAVE BEEN PROGRESSIVELY WORKING TO MODERNIZE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES FOR MANY, MANY YEARS WHILE THE U.S.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness46:58HAS NOT. SEN. KELLY: WE ARE IN THE

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator47:32PROCESS OF DOING THAT, AS WE SHOULD. WE HAVE A PROGRAM TO MODERNIZE AND WE ARE BUILDING MORE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. AND WE SHOULD BE MODERNIZING OUR FORCES. MY BIGGEST CONCERN HERE IS THAT THIS SYSTEM, BECAUSE THEIR PERCEPTION OF THIS MATTERS AND THIS SETS OFF ANOTHER ARMS RACE.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator47:33SUDDENLY WE ARE HAVING TO BUILD, THEY ARE BUILDING THOUSANDS MORE ICBM ICBM'S, CHINESE ARE BUILDING THOUSANDS MORE ICBM ICBM' ICBM'S. THIS SYSTEM IS NOT SIZED TO HANDLE IT. WE SPENT $1.2 TRILLION ON A SYSTEM THAT THEN BECOMES IRRELEVANT.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator47:33LET'S SAY THEORETICALLY, NOT WHAT THE REAL NUMBERS ARE, LET'S SAY WE COULD SHOOT DOWN 100 ICBM 'S. WILL THEY FIRE ANOTHER 100 OR 500? THEN OUR SYSTEM WAS WE SPENT $1.2 TRILLION, PEOPLE DON'T HAVE HEALTH CARE COVERAGE, THEY CAN'T AFFORD THEIR LIVES, WE ARE INVESTING TRILLIONS INTO DEFENSE AND WHAT WE GET OUT OF IT, WE GET 5, 10 YEARS DOWN THE ROAD AFTER THIS IS BUILT, WE HAVE A SYSTEM THAT DOESN'T EVEN PROVIDE US WHAT THE LEVEL 1 REQUIREMENTS OF THE SYSTEM WERE IN THE BEGINNING ON THE PIECE OF PAPER THE PRESIDENT SIGNED.

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator48:20MR. TRACHTENBERG: I APPRECIATE

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness48:59YOUR PERSPECTIVE. I DON'T THINK IT IS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF HOW HISTORY HAS EVOLVED THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR PERIOD IN TERMS OF U.S. ACTIONS DRIVING SOME KIND OF ARMS RACE. SEN. KELLY: MR. TRACHTENBERG TRACHTENBERG,

Mark Kelly, U.S. Senator49:13YOU SAID AFTER THE ABM TREATY THAT THAT IS WHEN THE RUSSIANS ACCELERATED THEIR DEVELOPMENT OF ICBM ICBM'S. I'M WAY OVER MY TIME. THANK YOU, MADAM CHAIR. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU, SENATOR KELLY P MR. TRACHTENBERG

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee49:29, IS IT TRUE THE CHINESE SPENT DECADES TILTING THEIR OWN INTEGRATIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM? MR. TRACHTENBERG: YES. CHAIR FISCHER: IS IT ALSO TRUE

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness49:39RUSSIANS HAVE A MASSIVE MISSILE

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee49:40DEFENSE SYSTEM SURROUNDING MOSCOW? MR. TRACHTENBERG: YES, TRUE FOR DECADES.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness49:44CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee49:48SENATOR REED? SEN. REED: THANK YOU GENTLEMEN FOR YOUR TESTIMONY.

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator49:56I WANT TO GET PERSPECTIVE ON THIS. I THINK ALL OF YOU HAVE CONCEDED THAT THIS WILL BE A PHASED DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT, NOT A DUPLICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER, IS THAT FAIR? MR. TRACHTENBERG: WOULD YOU REPHRASE THAT QUESTION PLEASE?

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness50:15SEN. REED: YOU HAVE INDICATED IN YOUR OWN TESTIMONY THAT THE

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator50:24ESTIMATES ARE FAR IN EXCESS, ETC. I THINK WHAT HAPPENED IS GENERAL GUETLEIN HAS NOT TAKEN THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER LITERALLY. HE HAS ESSENTIALLY RE-SCOPED IT SO IT IS LESS EXPENSIVE. IS THAT SOMETHING YOU WOULD CONCEDE?

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator50:24MR. TRACHTENBERG: I CAN'T SPEAK FOR HOW GENERAL GUETLEIN HAS

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness50:50BEEN ADDRESSING THE PARTICULAR ISSUE VIS-À-VIS THE EXECUTIVE ORDER. I HAVEN'T SPOKEN TO GENERAL GUETLEIN. I HEAR IN PRIVATE CAPACITY. I THINK THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHES A GOAL AND OBJECTIVE. THAT IS A LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness50:50WHETHER WE CAN GET TO THAT OR WHETHER WE GET TO THAT IN PIECES OVER TIME IS -- SEN. REED: WE HAVE TO DO WHAT IS

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator51:20NOT GOALS SO MUCH AS BUDGETS, TECHNOLOGIES AVAILABLE, ETC. AGAIN, MY SENSE IS THIS WILL BE STEP-BY-STEP. DR. KARAKO KARAKO? DR. KARAKO: I THINK IT IS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE IT HAS BEEN

Thomas O. Karako, Witness51:37DE-SCOPED FROM THE EXECUTIVE ORDER. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND GOLDEN DOME NOMENCLATURE IS KIND OF A RORSCHACH TEST. PEOPLE BRING TO BEAR CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS AND READ INTO IT. IT DOESN'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT AN IMPENETRABLE SHIELD OR NUMBER OF MISSILES.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness51:37IT DOESN'T TALK ABOUT NUMBERS. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE THING SEVERAL OF US ARE EMPHASIZING WHICH IS A LITTLE GOES A LONG WAY. I HOPE OUR CHINESE AND RUSSIAN FRIENDS ARE WATCHING THIS AND HEARING WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO PULL UP THE DRAWBRIDGE ON LIMITED ATTACKS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness51:37SO THE ONESIES AND TWO TWOSIES. NOT JUST ICBM ICBM'S, BUT DRONE ATTACKS, THE OPERATION SPIDERWEB ATTACK AT HOME. I WANT THEM TO KNOW WE ARE PREPARING FOR THAT. SEN.

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator52:32MR. MOSHER MR. MOSHER, YOU COSTED OUT THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER BUT IN YOUR COMMENTS YOU SAID IT WOULD BE A MUCH -- IT WOULD BE MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE IF DONE IN PHASES OVER THE NEXT 10 YEARS, IS THAT FAIR?

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator52:38MR. MOSHER: YES, THAT IS ACCURATE TO RATE OUR THAT

David E. Mosher, Witness52:54BASICALLY THE SIZE OF THE THREAT THE DEFENSE IS DESIGNED TO COUNTER IS A BIG FACTOR IN HOW EXPENSIVE THAT SYSTEM IS. OUR TAKE AWAY WAS, IT WAS FAIRLY COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE, INCLUDED MULTIPLE LAYERS, SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTORS.

David E. Mosher, Witness52:54IT WASN'T SPECIFIC ABOUT NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL AND I THINK TOM TALKED ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL, SPIDERWEB TYPE THREAT. IT IS DIFFERENT FROM SDI AND MISSILE DEFENSE WE HAVE HAD TO DATE. IF YOU BUILT LESS AND PHASED IT IN.

David E. Mosher, Witness52:54WE WROTE THIS REPORT AND HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THEY WERE PLANNING TO DO IT. WE GOT A BRIEFING FROM THEM FRIDAY FINALLY. THANKS TO EXCELLENT STAFF MAKING SURE THAT HAPPENED. WE APPRECIATE THAT.

David E. Mosher, Witness53:39I CAN'T TALK ABOUT THAT HERE, BUT IT IS TRUE THAT IF YOU BUILT IT IN A PHASED WAY OR BUILT LESS, IT WOULD COST LESS. WE BUILT OUR ESTIMATE THAT WAY SO YOU COULD PLAY PARLER GAMES WITH HOW MUCH IT WOULD COST.

David E. Mosher, Witness53:39SEN. REED: DR. KARAKO KARAKO, IF THIS

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator53:59IS A PHASE DR. KARAKO, IF THIS IS A PHASE, IT STRIKES ME THAT THE SBI SBI, SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR S, ARE PROBABLY FAR AWAY FROM DOING THAT. IF THAT IS THE CASE, I THINK WE HAVE TO ASK OURSELVES, IF WE KNOW THE SYSTEM WITHOUT SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTORS, WITH THE TIME AND MONEY, THE $185 BILLION, ARE WE GETTING WHAT WE INVESTED?

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator54:03FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS NOW IS HYPERSONIC'S. SBI WAS DESIGNED TO TAKE THEM OUT. WE DON'T HAVE SBI BUT SPENT $185 BILLION. HAVE WE REALLY INVESTED WISELY? DR. KARAKO: THE ANSWER IS YES, WE WOULD STILL GET A LOT OF

Thomas O. Karako, Witness54:51VALUE. GENERAL GUETLEIN DESCRIBE THE SBI AS HAVING DEMONSTRATIONS IN 2028, THEN 2035. WE HAVE TO FIGURE OUT THE VIABILITY, AND WOULD IT MAKE SENSE FOR SCALABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY. YOU CAN CLOSE THE DOOR AND LEAVE ALL THE WINDOWS OPEN.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness54:51THAT IS WHERE WE ARE ON ALL OTHER THREATS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM. I BELIEVE THE LOGIC OF SPACE AS WERE FIGHTING THE MAIN WILL THIS ACETATE SPACE FLYERS. IT MAY BE LIMITED, THAT IS POSSIBLE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness54:51BUT THERE IS STILL LOTS OF VALUE TO CLOSING OTHER WINDOWS TO THREATS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM. >> MAY I COMMENT ON THAT? I DO BELIEVE WE NEED TO GO TO SPACE. SAYING THAT IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE TECHNICAL CHALLENGES WE FACE WITH RESPECT TO SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR INTERCEPTORS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness55:40BUT I ALSO BELIEVE WE HAVE A CAPABLE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING CADRE OF SPECIALISTS WHO ARE INNOVATIVE, CREATIVE, AND CAN SOLVE TECHNICAL ISSUES RATHER THAN DISMISS TECHNICAL ISSUES AS IMPOSSIBLE AND NOT WORTH THE EFFORT.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness55:40THAT IS MY PERSONAL SENSE. SEN.

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator56:20APPRECIATED. THANK YOU, MADAM CHAIRMAN. >> THANK YOU, MADAM CHAIR FOR RECOGNIZING ME. ESPECIALLY SINCE I'M NOT A MEMBER OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE. WHEN PUT OUT INVITATIONS FOR HEARINGS THEY ARE USUALLY IMPORTANT AND I LIKE TO ATTEND.

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator56:23CHAIR FISCHER: I APPRECIATE YOUR

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee56:37ATTENDANCE HERE. IT IS NICE TO HAVE MEMBERS OF THE FULL COMMITTEE TAKEN INTEREST IN WHAT IS THE BEDROCK OF OUR SECURITY. WELCOME. >> THANK YOU. THIS PROGRAM WILL BE SCOPED AND WE WILL WORK TO FIND THE FUNDING AND PHASE IT IN HERE.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee56:39HOW DOES IT IMPACT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS EFFORT EFFORT, TO DO IT IN COOPERATION WITH CANADA? DR. KARAKO: I WOULD BE HAPPY TO JUMP ON THAT.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness57:15THE PRESIDENT LAST MAY, CANADA WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY HE IDENTIFIED AS PART OF THE GOLDEN DOME. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE JOINT COMMAND COMMAND. CANADA TO ITS CREDIT IS PUSHING FORWARD ON OVER THE HORIZON RADARS RADARS, FRIGATES AND THEY WERE LOOKING AT -- I THINK IT IS EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE THAT POLITICS IS GETTING IN THE WAY OF THAT COOPERATION, BECAUSE WE NEED OUR CANADIAN FRIENDS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness57:15I CAN THINK OF ABOUT SIX OTHER TYPES OF SENSORS FOR EARLY DETECTION AND TRACKING THREATS. THE ANSWER IS VERY IMPORTANT, AND THERE IS AN INTERNATIONAL ALLY TO PARTNER WITH. >> I THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE YOUR ANSWER AND I COMPLETELY AGREE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness58:00IT IS UNFORTUNATE UNFORTUNATE, I'VE NEVER HAD TO DO PEACEKEEPING VISITS BEFORE. I'VE HAD TO DO TWO IN THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF. IT IS UNFORTUNATE ALL STOP I'M GOING TO BE BLUNT. I THINK THIS IS NOT COMPLETELY A TWO-WAY STREET.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness58:00THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES TO LAUNCH A TRADE WAR AGAINST CANADA WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A ONE-SIDED TRADE WAR WAR, AND IF YOU LAUNCH IT THERE IS GOING TO BE A RESPONSE, HAS TAKEN A RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS BEEN SO IMPORTANT, SO STABLE STABLE, SO CRITICAL TO OUR ECONOMY, MUCH LESS DEFENSE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness58:45THE FACT THAT RELATIONSHIP IS NOW IN SUCH A BAD PLACE IS A REAL TRAGEDY. IT IS TO UNREALISTIC -- IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT YOU CAN TREAT AN ALLY BADLY ON THE ECONOMY AND THEN EXPECT THEM TO BE COOPERATIVE IN TERMS OF DEFENSE.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness58:45I SEE THIS PROBLEM ALL OVER THE GLOBE. I WAS IN GERMANY TO TALK TO GERMANY AND EUROPEAN ALLIES ABOUT UKRAINE AND WHAT WE CAN DO, IDEAS, HOW TO WORK TOGETHER AND I GOT KIND OF A TOUGH LECTURE FROM GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANS AND OTHERS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness59:32THEY SAY WE JUST ELECTED A CHANCELLOR WHO WILL BE THE MOST PRO-AMERICAN CHANCELLOR FOR QUITE A WHILE. AND WE'VE BEEN DOING A LOT ON UKRAINE AND WE WANT TO DO MORE MORE, BUT WE ELECTED A CHANCELLOR WITH A MANDATE TO JUMPSTART THE GERMAN ECONOMY.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness59:32AND RIGHT NOW, THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO OUR CHANCELLOR MEETING OUR ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE IS THE UNITED STATES AND THE TARIFFS. SO WE NEED TO LOOK AT THESE THINGS NOT IN SILOS BUT COMPREHENSIVELY. I WORRY THAT USING GOLDEN DOME AS AN EXAMPLE, THE CANADIANS CALL IT CONTINENTAL SHIELD BUT IT IS THE SAME IDEA.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness60:17TO EXPECT THEM TO DO WHAT YOU SAY THEY NEED TO -- OR WHAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT THEM TO DO IN THIS ENVIRONMENT IS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC. I HOPE WE ARE ALIGNING OUR DEFENSE PRIORITIES WITH OUR ECONOMIC ACTIONS AND RHETORIC.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness60:17LET ME ASK A SECOND QUESTION BECAUSE I THINK SENATOR FISCHER ASKED BEFORE I CAME IN IN, SO I APOLOGIZE IF I AM REPEATING. IN AN UNCLASSIFIED WAY, RECOGNIZING WE ARE HERE SO THERE ARE SOME THINGS YOU CAN'T SAY, WHAT ARE CHOKEPOINTS IN OUR SUPPLY CHAIN OR AREAS WE SHOULD BE FOCUSING ON AS A COMMITTEE, TO TRY AND ACCELERATE CAPABILITIES IN PRODUCTION, TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE?

Thomas O. Karako, Witness61:02MR. MOSHER: IT IS BASICALLY THE INTERCEPTORS WE ARE USING TO A

David E. Mosher, Witness61:37LARGE EXTENT OVERSEAS. WE ARE IN A SITUATION WHERE DEPENDING ON WHAT THE GOLDEN DOME DECIDES TO DEPLOY, THEY ARE LIKELY TO RELY ON SYSTEMS THAT EXIST TODAY, BUT THOSE INTERCEPTORS ARE ALSO BEING DEPLETED ABROAD.

David E. Mosher, Witness61:37SOLVING THAT PROBLEM I WOULD SAY IS THE FIRST AND FOREMOST. >> AND EVEN THAT KIND OF DEPENDS OR COULD BE HELPED BY PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH ALLIES, BECAUSE IT IS NOT JUST THE U.S.. THAT COULD HELP US HAVE A CAPACITY, TO ENABLE US TO MEET WHATEVER THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE IS.

David E. Mosher, Witness62:23>> YES SENATOR. THE GERMANS IN PARTICULAR IS. >> YES SENATOR. THE GERMANS IN PARTICULAR. THEY ARE DOING REMARKABLE THINGS. THEY ARE VERY INTERESTED IN COPRODUCTION. THEY ARE GOING TO -- IT IS NOT THE 1980'S ANYMORE.

David E. Mosher, Witness62:23THEY WANT GROUND-BASED TOMAHAWK WHICH IS NOW BUILT IN ARIZONA. THIS IS WHERE I WOULD POINT TO THE MUNITIONS RAMP AND ACCELERATION GOING ON. RIGHT ALONG GOLDEN DOME, IT HAS TO HAPPEN FOR EVERYTHING, JUST TO GET BACK TO PRE-JANUARY LEVELS.

David E. Mosher, Witness63:08BUT THE GERMANS AND A LOT OF FOLKS OR INTERESTED IN BROADENING THE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND SUPPLY CHAIN. >> COULD MR. TRACHTENBERG ADDRESS EITHER OF THOSE? MR. TRACHTENBERG: I WILL LEAVE THE SUPPLY CHAIN ISSUES TO THOSE

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness63:35WHO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SUPPLY CHAIN, BUT I WILL SAY IT IS IMPORTANT TO WORK WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES ON THIS EFFORT EFFORT. THAT INCLUDES THE CANADIANS, NATO. WE SHOULD BE LEARNING LESSONS FROM THE UKRAINIANS, TAKING AWAY INFORMATION FROM THE ISRAELIS.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness63:35THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISSILE AND ROCKET ATTACKS. THOSE WHO HAVE INVESTED INVESTED, DESPITE THE CONCERNS THAT TESTING DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IS MORE EXPENSIVE. THEY STILL FIND VALUE IN SAVING LIVES. WE SHOULD BE ENGAGING THEM AND LEARNING FROM THEM AND TAKING THE LESSONS WE CAN APPLY TO GOLDEN DOME.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness64:20THE MORE WE ARE ABLE TO DEFEND OUR OWN COUNTRY, OUR OWN PEOPLE PEOPLE, I THINK THE MORE FLEXIBILITY WE WILL HAVE, AND COMING TO THE AID OF OTHER COUNTRIES WITH WHOM WE HAVE TREATY COMMITMENTS, OR ARE PLEDGED TO DEFEND.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness64:20I THINK THAT IS AN ASPECT OF GOLDEN DOME THAT GETS OVERLOOKED . IT WOULD PROVIDE US ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO HELP DEFEND FRIENDS AND ALLIES ABROAD. >> THANK YOU. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU SENATOR KAINE.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee65:09WHEN WE TALK ABOUT DEFENDING OUR HOMELAND, MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THE GBI'S WE HAVE IN ALASKA AND CALIFORNIA -- THOSE ARE NOT GEARED TO DEFEND AGAINST CHINA AND RUSSIA. THEY ARE FOR DEFENSE AGAINST NORTH KOREA.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee65:09A MORE SIMPLISTIC NUCLEAR WARHEAD COMING TO OUR HOMELAND. WITHOUT THE ADDED EXTRAS THAT OUR PEER ADVERSARIES WOULD HAVE. WOULD IT BE SAFE TO SAY THAT WE DON'T HAVE AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO THE THREATS WE ARE FACING?

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee65:55YES OR NO? MR. TRACHTENBERG: I WOULD AGREE. CHAIR FISCHER: DOCTOR?

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness66:09DR. KARAKO: YES, SENATOR SENATOR.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee66:11CHAIR FISCHER: SENATOR KAINE

Thomas O. Karako, Witness66:15TALKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP WE

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee66:16HAVE WITH CANADA AND I WILL CONCLUDE WITH THIS COMMENT. THEY ARE A GOOD ALLY, A GOOD NEIGHBOR, THEY ARE MODERNIZING MOURAD RIGHT NOW -- MODERNIZING NORAD RIGHT NOW. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT AN AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED WITH CANADA YET ON GOLDEN DOME.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee66:16I THINK AS WE PROGRESS, MY HOPE WOULD BE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO HAVE A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP , TO REALLY PROTECT BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES. SO I APPRECIATE YOU BRINGING THAT UP AS WELL.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee66:16SENATOR KING? THEN WE WILL CONCLUDE WITH SENATOR REED. SEN.

Angus King, U.S. Senator67:11WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DEFENDING OUR COUNTRY. THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY SINCE WORLD WAR II HAS BEEN DETERRENCE DETERRENCE, MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION. ANY COUNTRY THAT ATTACKS US KNOWS THAT THEY ARE GOING TO BE DEVASTATED, DECIMATED AND THEREFORE THEY ARE DETERRED FROM ACTING.

Angus King, U.S. Senator67:14I'VE ALWAYS BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF DETERRENCE BY THE NILE. IF THERE WAS SOME MAGIC SOLUTION WHERE WE COULD DENY ANY ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES BY CRUISE MISSILES, ICBM, TERRORIST UAVS, MAYBE. IT SEEMS TO ME IF YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT FINITE DOLLARS DOLLARS, THE MOST IMPORTANT EXPENDITURE WE COULD MAKE WOULD BE TO MATURE OUR SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY, WHICH UNDERLIES THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator68:00IF THEY KNOW THEY CAN'T KNOCK OUT A MISSILE FIELD IN WYOMING WYOMING, THEY CAN'T KNOCK OUT OUR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES SUBMARINES, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO ATTACK IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE BEST ATTACK IS THE ONE THAT DOES NOT OCCUR.

Angus King, U.S. Senator68:00IT STRIKES ME THAT IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT FINITE DOLLARS, THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER PUT -- AND THE PRESIDENT EVEN MENTIONED THIS -- IT WOULD BE BETTER PUT TOWARDS ENSURING THE PROTECTION OF OUR SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY, WHICH FEEDS INTO THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE THAT HAS PROTECTED THIS COUNTRY FOR 80 YEARS.

Angus King, U.S. Senator68:45MR. TRACHTENBERG: AT THE RISK OF

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness68:52SOUNDING LIKE A MAXIMALIST, I DON'T BELIEVE THIS AN EITHER OR PROPOSITION. EITHER WE WORK -- EITHER WE PROTECT OUR RETALIATORY CAPABILITY OR BUILD DEFENSES. I SEE GOLDEN DOME AS AN ADJUNCT TO HELP DETERRENCE.

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness68:54NOT TO UNDERMINE IT. NOT TO TAKE RESOURCES AWAY FROM THE NECESSARY OFFENSE OF NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. I SEE THEM AS TUMBLE NUNNERY. SEN. KING: IT IS A QUESTION OF

Angus King, U.S. Senator69:24COST AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AND WHAT IS IT? IS IT GOING TO PROTECT CLEVELAND , BUT NOT SIOUX FALLS? IS IT GOING TO PROTECT NEW YORK BUT NOT RICHMOND? I THINK THAT IS AN UNANSWERED QUESTION AND AS NEAR AS I CAN TELL, PROTECTING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY IS IMPOSSIBLE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator69:28SO THERE ARE GOING TO BE CHOICES MADE, AND I THINK THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE TO BE HONEST WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ABOUT WHAT IT IS THAT WE ARE DOING. WE ARE NOT BUILDING SOMETHING THAT WILL PROTECT EVERY PERSON IN THE COUNTRY FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR ATTACK.

Angus King, U.S. Senator69:28THAT IS WHERE WE GET INTO MAKING CHOICES. AND THE QUESTION IS COST AND A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE USE WOULD BE TO ENSURE SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY, WHICH UNDERLINES THE WHOLE PREMISE PREMISE. MR. TRACHTENBERG: YES, WE DO NOT

David J. Trachtenberg, Witness70:24KNOW YET BECAUSE IT HAS NOT BEEN BUILT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT ULTIMATELY IT IS GOING TO LOOK LIKE. SEN. KING: BUT YOU HAVE TO START

Angus King, U.S. Senator70:36OUT WITH A PLAN, WE ARE GOING TO PROTECT THESE ASSETS, THESE CITIES, THESE MILITARY ASSETS ASSETS. TALKS ABOUT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, THAT IS THE ENTIRE GRID OF THE UNITED STATES. I THINK WE NEED TO BE MORE REAL ABOUT THIS THIS, AND HONEST WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Angus King, U.S. Senator70:38MR. MOSHER: ONE TIME I WENT IN

David E. Mosher, Witness71:05AND SAID MAYBE WE SHOULD HAVE A MAP THAT SHOWS PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT. HE DID NOT THINK THAT WAS FUNNY, BUT I DID AT THE TIME. YOU RAISED THIS ISSUE ABOUT HOW MUCH ARE WE DEFENDING AND WHAT ARE WE DEFENDING, AND I HAPPENED TO TEACH A CLASS ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE AT GEORGIA AND ONE OF THE THINGS I TRIED TO INSTILL IN MY STUDENTS -- SEN. KING: I DID MY --

Angus King, U.S. Senator71:35MR. MOSHER: WHAT IS THE GOAL OF A MISSILE DEFENSE AND WHAT IS

David E. Mosher, Witness71:39THE THREAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DEAL WITH. IF YOU PARSE THE DIFFERENT PIECES, THE DIFFERENT THREATS WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT, WHETHER IT IS LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS -- SEN. KING: WE TALKED ABOUT SPACE

Angus King, U.S. Senator71:58WEAPONS DWELLING OVERHEAD. MR. MOSHER: IT COULD BE SHORT

David E. Mosher, Witness72:02RANGE STUFF WITH DRONES. IF YOU THINK ABOUT WHAT IS IT I AM TRYING TO DEFEND AGAINST, THAT SORT OF HELPS LEAD YOU TO THE SORTS OF SOLUTIONS THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED. SEN.

Angus King, U.S. Senator72:14THAT IS ESSENTIALLY WHAT I AM ASKING, WHAT IS THE PLAN? DR. KARAKO: DOLLAR FOR DOLLAR, WHY NOT HAVE A SECURE SECOND

Thomas O. Karako, Witness72:23STRIKE? A SPECIFICALLY SECURE NUCLEAR SECOND STRIKE. THE PROBLEM WITH THAT LOGIC IS IT PRESUPPOSES THAT THE FIRST THING WE REACH FOR IS THAT NUCLEAR RETALIATION. SEN. KING: CONVENTIONAL SECOND

Angus King, U.S. Senator72:41STRIKE AS WELL. IT IS NOT A CREDIBLE DETERRENT IF NUCLEAR IS OUR ONLY OPTION. DR. KARAKO: THAT IS HOW I THINK

Thomas O. Karako, Witness72:49ABOUT THE DEFENSE AT LONG. IT IS ABOUT PROTECTING OUR CONVENTIONAL POWER CAPABILITIES. AT THE HOMELAND, WE HAVE 77% OF THE JOINT FORCE AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THINK ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF DETERRENCE BY THE NILE NILE, DECAPITATING NONNUCLEAR STRATEGIC ATTACK.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness72:50IT COULD BE LEADERSHIP OR SOME OTHER WAY -- SO WE CANNOT FLOW FORCES ABROAD. PEOPLE TALK ABOUT A SPACE PEARL HARBOR OR A CYBER PEARL HARBOR. I'M WORRIED ABOUT A PEARL HARBOR PEARL HARBOR.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness72:50THAT IS THE LOGIC OF TRYING TO HAVE DETERRENCE BY THE NILE WITH NONNUCLEAR STRATEGIC ATTACKS. SEN. KING: I AGREE ON THE DANGER

Angus King, U.S. Senator73:38OF A DECAPITATION STRIKE. THAT IS WHY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE SHOULD BE IN KANSAS CITY. DR. KARAKO: NOT MAINE?

Thomas O. Karako, Witness73:50CHAIR FISCHER: RANKING MEMBER RE NOT MAINE? CHAIR FISCHER: RANKING MEMBER REED?

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee73:56RANKING MEMBER REED: THE WHOLE PREMISE OF THE GOLDEN DOME IS

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator74:04THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO FEED -- DEFEAT A LIMITED NUMBER OF MISSILES ENCROACHING ON THE UNITED STATES. WHAT IS CHEAPER? TO BUILD A GOLDEN DOME OR TO BUILD A LOT MORE MISSILES IF YOU ARE SOMEONE ELSE ELSE, AND YOU CAN DEFEAT THE SYSTEM?

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator74:04MR. MOSHER: GENERALLY THE VIEW IS OFFENSE IS CHEAPER AND YOU

David E. Mosher, Witness74:31DON'T HAVE TO NECESSARILY BUILD MISSILES. YOU CAN HAVE COUNTERMEASURES OR OTHER THINGS. I THINK THE COUNTER TO THAT IS IF WE CAN OUTSPEND THEM. THIS WAS THE LOGIC WITH DEFENDING AGAINST NORTH KOREA. THEY CAN'T OUTSPEND US.

David E. Mosher, Witness74:31AND WHERE THAT TRADE HAPPENS IS UP TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS. DR.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness75:06IF YOU PUT YOURSELF IN THE SHOES OF THE CHINESE, I WOULDN'T TRY TO JUST TAKE OUT THE MISSILES MISSILES. I WOULD RATHER ATTACK OUR ENTIRE KILL CHAIN. ATTACKING OUR LEADERSHIP, ATTACKING COMMAND AND CONTROL.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness75:09THERE ARE SO MANY WAYS IN WHICH TO TAKE US APART BESIDES OFFENSE VERSUS DEFENSE AND THAT IS WHERE I SEE THE REAL VALUE OF LIMITED DEFENSE, PROTECTING THOSE CRITICAL THINGS, SO THEY CAN'T ACCOMPLISH IT WITH A COUPLE CHEAP SHOTS.

Thomas O. Karako, Witness75:09RANKING MEMBER REED: THE

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator75:43QUESTION IS WHAT IS THE THREAT, AND THE THREAT DEFINITION ALL THROUGH THIS DISCUSSION IS 10 MISSILES OR 20 DRONES, SOMETHING SMALL SMALL. WHEN IN FACT IT'S QUITE EASY TO BUILD LOTS OF THESE THINGS.

Jack Reed, U.S. Senator75:47THE OTHER ISSUE IS IN THIS ASYMMETRICAL WORLD, WE HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT SOMEONE OUT IN BETHESDA LAUNCHING A DRONE, AND HITTING OUR EXECUTIVE OFFICES. THANK YOU GENTLEMEN. CHAIR FISCHER: THANK YOU SENATOR

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee76:23REED AND TO OUR PANEL. IF ANY COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAVE QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD, I WOULD ASK THAT THEY SUBMIT THEM SOON, AND WE WILL GET THOSE TO YOU. IF YOU COULD RESPOND WITHIN TWO WEEKS, THAT WOULD BE GOOD.

Deb Fischer, Chair, Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee76:25WITH THAT, THE HEARING IS ADJOURNED.

Transcribe YouTube videos →

Paste an accessible public YouTube video or Shorts URL: you do not need to download it to your device. LongScribe uses captions when available or transcribes reachable speech with AI. Three hours is 180 transcription minutes; signed-in Free includes 60 minutes across 20 recordings per month, subject to remaining allowance, per-job limits and source availability. Completed eligible account jobs can export TXT, SRT, DOCX or JSON; the anonymous demo is a separate flow with its own limits.

✨ Transcribed with Longscribe. Turn your own audio & video into text for free.
Try Longscribe →